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INTRODUCTION
Access to courts is crucial for making substantive rights that
exist on paper real and enforceable in the real world.' And access to
federal courts requires having "standing" to assert those rights.2 For all
practical purposes, standing is the key to the courthouse door.3 Fred
* University Research Professor f Law, University of Alabama School of Law. Thanks to
Jenny Carroll, Heather Elliott, and Howard Wasserman for their helpful comments on this piece.
1. See, e.g., STEPHEN BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017); Arthur R.
Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the
Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 288, 304 (2013) (arguing that "the
distinguished proceduralists who drafted the Federal Rules believed in citizen access to the courts
and in the resolution of disputes on their merits" but that recently the Supreme Court has
"impaired both access to the federal courts for many citizens and the enforcement of various
national policies"); Judith Resnik, Revising Our "Common Intellectual Heritage": Federal and State
Courts in Our Federal System, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1831, 1836 (2016) (criticizing "judicial
overrides of new federal statutory rights and judge-made constraints on remedies").
2. See Resnik, supra note 1, at 1890-98 (criticizing some of the Court's recent standing
decisions); Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials:
Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 295-306 (1988)
(criticizing several of the Court's standing decisions from the 1970s and 1980s).
3. Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When Conservative Plaintiffs Lose
Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 553 (2012) (describing how "standing
doctrine has barred the federal courthouse door" for cases pursuing both liberal and conservative
causes). Stated more precisely, establishing standing is the key to one of many locks on the
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Smith's article Undemocratic Restraint4 identifies and critiques an
important trend in the Supreme Court's decisions on standing: the
transformation of concepts that had been viewed as judicially-created
"prudential" limits on a party's standing to sue into concepts grounded
in positive law, such as federal statutes or the Constitution.
A recent example of this is Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc.5 The Court's unanimous decision in Lexmark
declared that the "zone-of-interests" test should not be understood as a
feature of "prudential standing."6 Rather, "[w]hether a plaintiff comes
within the 'zone of interests' is an issue that requires us to determine,
using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, whether a
legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular
plaintiffs claim."7
Other prudential doctrines have been transplanted to the
Constitution itself. For example, the Supreme Court has rejected the
view that its refusal to hear suits that are mere "generalized
grievances" is based merely on "prudential" reasons.8 Rather "such suits
do not present constitutional 'cases' or 'controversies,' " and therefore
fall outside the federal judiciary's jurisdiction under Article III.9 And,
although it has yet to garner a five-Justice majority, several Justices
have asserted that "adverseness" between the parties is a constitutional
requirement of Article III standing,10 rather than merely a "prudential
courthouse door. See Miller, supra note 1, at 309 (describing how "federal courts have erected a
sequence of procedural stop signs during the past twenty-five years that has transformed the
relatively uncluttered pretrial process envisioned by the original drafters of the Federal Rules into
a morass of litigation friction points"); Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil
Procedure After the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMoRY L.J. 1, 14-17 (2016) (describing how pleading
and discovery standards can constrict access to courts and enforcement of substantive rights).
4. 70 VAND. L. REV. 845 (2017).
5. 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
6. Id. at 1387 (noting that "we admittedly have placed that test under the 'prudential rubric
in the past" (citing Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004)) but stating
that "it does not belong there").
7. Id. (citation omitted); see also Bank of America Corp. v. Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1302
(2017) ("In Lexmark, we said that the label 'prudential standing' was misleading, for the
requirement at issue is in reality tied to a particular statute.").
8. Id. at 1387 n.3. The Court recognized that "we have at times grounded our reluctance to
entertain such suits in the 'counsels of prudence.' " Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982)).
9. Id. (citing Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (per curiam); DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344-46 (2006); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-574
(1992)).
10. See Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1716-17 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring,
joined by Roberts, C.J. & Alito, J.) ("The judicial Power of the United States extends only to Cases
and Controversies. This requirement limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to issues
presented in an adversary context." (alteration in original)); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2701 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J. & Thomas, J.) (calling the
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consideration."" Some other prudential doctrines-such as restrictions
on third-party standing12-have been flagged for potential
reassignment in the future.13
Judicially-created obstacles to enforcing substantive rights and
obligations have long been critiqued as anti-democratic.14 The recent
moves that Smith describes, however, present a slightly more nuanced
question. Does it enhance democratic values to transplant judicially-
created doctrines of prudential standing to other "place[s] in the
standing firmament?"15 Smith's Article comprehensively and
persuasively shows that such transplantation does not enhance-and
in many ways actively undermines-those values.16
This Essay looks at two doctrines that have been part of the
recent transplantation trend and that have figured in Supreme Court
decisions handed down in the weeks after Smith's Article was
published. Following Smith's lead, this Essay distinguishes between
what might be called constitutional and nonconstitutional
transplantation. Nonconstitutional transplantation refers to framing
formerly prudential concerns as questions of statutory interpretation.17
As for this category, this Essay addresses the scope and content of the
zone-of-interests test, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's 2017
decision in Bank of America Corp. v. Miami.18 Constitutional
transplantation refers to recasting formerly prudential concerns as
majority's view that "the requirement of adverseness [is] a 'prudential aspect of standing ...
incomprehensible").
11. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685-87 (majority opinion) (holding that the requirement of
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions" is a "prudential consideration" rather
than a "jurisdictional requirement[] of Article III" (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962))).
12. See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3 (noting that "limitations on third-party standing are
harder to classify").
13. See id. ("This case does not present any issue of third-party standing, and consideration
of that doctrine's proper place in the standing firmament can await another day.").
14. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 4, at 849 (noting the argument hat "such limits arguably
undercut or subvert the role of the more politically accountable body-Congress"); id. at 850
(noting Justice Scalia's argument that "prudential limits writ large are overly 'judge-empowering'
at the expense of democratically accountable bodies"); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
"Passive Virtues" A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1(1964).
15. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3.
16. See Smith, supra note 4, at 851; see also, e.g., id. at 891 ("[C]onstitutionalizing prudential
rules on federal judicial power will lead to countermajoritarian invalidations of legislation."); id.
at 909 ("Placing a constitutional label on a prudential doctrine does not make the doctrine more
democratic.").
17. Smith calls this "Codifying Prudence." Smith, supra note 4, at 910-914.
18. 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
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limitations on the "Judicial Power" inherent in Article 111.19 As for this
category, this Essay discusses the adverseness requirement, which was
the focus of three concurring Justices in the Court's 2017 decision in
Microsoft Corp. u. Baker.20
I. NONCONSTITUTIONAL TRANSPLANTATION: THE ZONE -OF-INTERESTS
TEST
To this point, the most significant example of nonconstitutional
transplantation has been the Court's treatment of the zone-of-interests
test, as described above in the Lexmark case.21 In and of itself,
grounding the zone-of-interests inquiry in statutory interpretation
rather than judicial prudence does not necessarily change how a court
must assess whether a particular plaintiffs interests "fall within the
zone of interests protected by the law invoked."22 That is, courts might
potentially take an equally broad or narrow approach to that issue
regardless of whether it is done under the rubric of judicial prudence or
under the rubric of "determin[ing], using traditional tools of statutory
interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action
encompasses a particular plaintiffs claim."2 3
The Court's transplantation of the zone-of-interests test does,
however, resolve what had been some uncertainty in the lower courts
regarding whether that inquiry was jurisdictional.24 The D.C. Circuit,
for example, held prior to Lexmark that compliance with the prudential
zone-of-interests test was a jurisdictional requirement, which could be
raised at any time notwithstanding the defendant's waiver of the
issue.25 Other Circuits had found the zone-of-interests test to be a
nonjurisdictional inquiry.26
19. Smith calls this "Constitutionalizing Prudence." Smith, supra note 4, at 877-889.
20. 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1716-17 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J. & Alito,
J.).
21. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing Lexmark).
22. Bank of America, 137 S. Ct. at 1302 (quoting Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388).
23. Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1387.
24. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD D. FREER,
13AFEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531.7 n. 1 (noting prior to Lexmark "a deep and important
circuit split on the question whether prudential standing goes to jurisdiction or only to the wise
exercise of jurisdiction" (citing Lucas v. Jerusalem Cafe, LLC, 721 F.3d 927, 938-39 (8th Cir.
2013))).
25. See Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n v. E.P.A., 693 F.3d 169, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (treating the zone-
of-interests test as a "jurisdictional issue[]"); id. at 180 (Tatel, J., concurring) ("I ... agree with
those circuits that have held that prudential standing is non-jurisdictional . . . . This Circuit,
however, has directly held to the contrary." (citing Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 697 (D.C. Cir.
1994); Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720, 723 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1994))).
26. See, e.g., American Iron & Steel Institute v. OSHA, 182 F.3d 1261, 1274 n.10 (11th Cir.
1999) ("We can pretermit the more difficult question regarding whether the Doctors' members'
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Now that it has been transplanted, the zone-of-interests test can
no longer be viewed as a jurisdictional requirement.27 This recognition
is consistent with the Supreme Court's recent trend of rejecting
attempts to treat certain merits-related issues as jurisdictional.28
Indeed, the Court has candidly admitted that its past decisions had
lacked precision in this regard. It has discouraged courts and litigants
from relying on "drive-by jurisdictional rulings" 2 9 in prior decisions-
that is, cases in which the Court made an "unrefined disposition"30 on
purported jurisdictional grounds without "explicitly considering"
whether the dispositive issues instead should have been viewed as
merits or nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules.31
While this clarification is an important one, there remain a
number of questions regarding how, exactly, the newly transplanted
zone-of-interests test is supposed to operate. In this regard, there is
conflicting language not only within the Lexmark decision itself, but
interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the OSH Act because prudential standing is
flexible and not jurisdictional in nature."); see also Gilda Indus., Inc. v. United States, 446 F.3d
1271, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (refusing to consider the defendant's zone-of-interests argument that
the plaintiffs claim was barred by the zone-of-interests test because it "did not contend in its brief
that Gilda's complaint should be barred by the zone of interests test" and "has thus waived that
argument").
27. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1391 n.6 (noting that "the zone-of-interests test ... does not
implicate subject-matter jurisdiction"); see also id. at 1387 n.4 (arguing that the term "statutory
standing" was "misleading, since the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action
does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court's statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case" (alteration in original) (emphasis in original)); Howard M. Wasserman,
Fletcherian Standing, Merits, and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 257, 265-266
(2015) (reading Lexmark as establishing that the zone-of-interests test is not jurisdictional);
Ernest A. Young, Prudential Standing After Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 149, 159 (2014) (same).
28. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 253-54 (2010) (rejecting
the view that "the extraterritorial reach of§ 10(b) [of the 1934 Securities Act] ... raise[s] a question
of subject-matter jurisdiction" because "to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct
§ 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question"); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166,
170 (2010) (holding that the copyright-registration requirement codified in 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) is a
nonjurisdictional "precondition to suit" and "does not restrict a federal court's subject-matter
jurisdiction"); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006) ("[T]he threshold number of
employees for application of Title VII is an element of a plaintiffs claim for relief, not a
jurisdictional issue."). One troubling exception to this trend was the Court's decision in Bowles u.
Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), which ruled 5-4 that failure to timely file a notice of appeal was a
'mandatory and jurisdictional" requirement that could not be cured even in the presence of unique,
extraordinary circumstances. See generally 4B CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & ADAM
N. STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1168 (4th ed. 2015 & Supp. 2017) (discussing
Bowles).
29. E.g., Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523
U.S. 83, 91 (1998)).
30. Id.
31. Id. (quoting Da Silva v. Kinsho Int'l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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also between Lexmark and the Supreme Court's 2017 decision in Bank
of America Corp. v. Miami.32
One question is this. Is the zone-of-interests test an absolute
requirement that must be satisfied for a given plaintiff to have a viable
cause of action? Or does it merely create a rebuttable presumption that
a plaintiff who falls outside a statute's zone of interests lacks a cause of
action? Justice Scalia's Lexmark opinion began by describing the zone-
of-interests test as presumptive rather than absolute: "we presume that
a statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose interests 'fall
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.' "33 But later
in the opinion, Justice Scalia described the zone-of-interests test as "a
requirement of general application."34 And he explained that it was
"perhaps more accurate, though not very different as a practical matter,
to say that the limitation always applies and is never negated, but that
our analysis of certain statutes will show that they protect a more-than-
usually expansive range of interests."35
In its 2017 Bank of America decision, however, Justice Breyer's
majority opinion emphasized that falling outside the zone of interests
creates only a presumption that the plaintiff lacks a cause of action:
"The question is whether the statute grants the plaintiff the cause of
action that he asserts. In answering that question, we presume that a
statute ordinarily provides a cause of action 'only to plaintiffs whose
interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.'
"36 He made no reference to the view expressed in Lexmark that it was
"perhaps more accurate" to understand the zone-of-interests
"requirement" as one that can "never" be "negated."37 Justice Breyer
ultimately concluded that the City of Miami-which had sued Bank of
America for violations of the Fair Housing Act that led to lost tax
revenues and additional municipal expenses-did fall within the zone
of interests of the Fair Housing Act's antidiscrimination provisions.
Justice Breyer therefore did not need to confront what factors might be
sufficient to rebut the presumption against a valid cause of action in
cases where a plaintiff fell outside a statute's zone of interests.
In practice, this may be merely a semantic issue that is unlikely
to affect the ultimate result in many cases. Given the inherent
32. See 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
33. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388 (emphasis added).
34. Id. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997)).
35. Id. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 (1997)) (citation omitted) (second
emphasis added).
36. Bank of America, 137 S. Ct. at 1302.
37. See supra note 31 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 (1997)).
294 [Vol. 70:289
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malleability of the zone-of-interests test,3 8 a judge who is inclined to
permit a cause of action in a particular case would likely have enough
leeway to determine that the particular plaintiff did fall within the
statute's zone of interests-rather than finding that the plaintiff fell
outside the statute's zone of interests but that other factors were
sufficient to rebut a presumption against permitting a cause of action.
In terms of doctrine, however, the analytical structure remains unclear.
A related but potentially distinct question is how strong of a
showing a plaintiff must make to satisfy the zone-of-interests test. In
Bank of America, Justice Breyer's majority opinion found that the City
of Miami satisfied the zone-of interests test because "the City's claims
of injury it suffered as a result of the statutory violations are, at the
least, arguably within the zone of interests that the [Fair Housing Act]
protects."39 The "arguably" qualifier suggests an approach to the zone-
of-interests test that is more deferential to plaintiffs. It is much easier
to present a theory that is "arguabl[e]" than one that is, say,
"persuasive" or "correct" or "meritorious."
In the earlier Lexmark decision, however, Justice Scalia rebuked
the notion that a plaintiffs claims need only be "arguably" within the
statute's zone of interests. He wrote that even though earlier Supreme
Court decisions had "conspicuously included the word 'arguably' in the
test to indicate that the benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff," that
"lenient approach" applies only with respect to judicial review of agency
action under the Administrative Procedure Act-not to claims seeking
relief based on other federal statutes.40 Justice Breyer's reinvigoration
of the "arguably" qualifier in Bank of America calls into question
whether the view expressed by Justice Scalia in Lexmark remains
operative.
Finally, it is uncertain whether the zone-of-interests test is
coterminous with the overarching question of whether a particular
plaintiff may sue, or whether it is one of multiple elements that inform
the ultimate question of whether a particular plaintiff may sue. Justice
Scalia's Lexmark decision initially seems to embrace the former view.
He wrote that "[w]hether a plaintiff comes within the zone of interests
is an issue that requires us to determine, using traditional tools of
statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of
action encompasses a particular plaintiffs claim."4 1 He also wrote that
38. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, TheReformation ofAmericanAdministrativeLaw, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1669, 1731 (1975) (noting the "vagueness" of "[t]he opaque 'zone of interests' test").
39. Bank of America, 137 S. Ct. at 1303 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
40. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1389 (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi
Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 225 (2012)).
41. Id. at 1387 (alteration in original).
2017] 295
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"the zone-of-interests analysis ... asks whether this particular class of
persons has a right to sue under this substantive statute."42
Later in the opinion, however, Justice Scalia took the view that
satisfying the zone-of-interests test is a necessary-but apparently not
sufficient-requirement for a plaintiff to have a cause of action. He
wrote that proximate causation, for example, imposed an additional
limitation on a plaintiffs ability to sue-independent of whether the
zone-of-interest test is satisfied.4 3 He explained that both "the zone-of-
interests test" and "proximate causation" are "element[s] of a cause of
action under the statute."44 And he rejected a proposed approach that
would have treated the zone-of-interests test and proximate causation
as "mere factors to be considered" in deciding whether a cause of action
exists for a particular plaintiffs claim, because "those requirements ...
must be met in every case."4 5 The 2017 Bank of America decision also
treated the zone-of-interests test and proximate cause as distinct
requirements for claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The
majority concluded that injuries incurred by the City of Miami-lost tax
revenue and extra municipal expenses-"fall within the zone of
interests that the FHA arguably protects,"46 and therefore "satisfy the
cause -of- action' (or 'prudential standing') requirement."47 Yet it
remanded the case for lower courts to assess whether Bank of America's
alleged discriminatory conduct proximately caused the city's injuries. 48
To be clear, in both Lexmark and Bank of America, the zone-of-
interests test and the proximate-cause requirement are each inferred
by the judiciary rather than explicitly imposed by Congress.49 Yet both
ultimately answer the question of "whether a legislatively conferred
cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiffs claim."50 Indeed,
Justice Scalia's Lexmark opinion described an earlier Supreme Court
decision-Associated General Contractors of California v. California
42. Id. (alteration in original).
43. Id. at 1388 (using both "zone of interests and proximate causality" to answer "a
straightforward question of statutory interpretation: Does the cause of action in § 1125(a) extend
to plaintiffs like Static Control?").
44. Id. at 1391 n.6
45. Id. at 1392.
46. Bank of America, 137 S. Ct. at 1301.
47. Id. at 1303.
48. Id. at 1306 (concluding that "the Eleventh Circuit erred in holding that foreseeability is
sufficient to establish proximate cause under the FHA" but declining "to draw the precise
boundaries of proximate cause under the FHA and to determine on which side of the line the City's
financial injuries fall").
49. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1390 (" [W]e generally presume that a statutory cause of action is
limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the statute."); accord
Bank of America, 137 S. Ct. at 1305 (quoting Lexmark).
50. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387.
296 [Vol. 70:289
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State Council of Carpenters5 1-as defining the "class of persons who
could maintain a private damages action" as those persons "whose
injuries were proximately caused by a defendant's antitrust
violations."52 The conceptual question is this: if the transplanted zone-
of-interest test itself is simply the "determin[ation], using traditional
tools of statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause
of action encompasses aparticular plaintiffs claim," 53 then doesn't that
test necessarily include interpretive moves like presuming a proximate-
cause requirement and assessing whether the injuries suffered by that
"particular plaintiffH" were proximately caused by the statutory
violation?54
II. CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSPLANTATION: THE ADVERSENESS
REQUIREMENT
As Smith demonstrates in his Article, constitutional
transplantation of prudential standing doctrines is especially
problematic from a democratic perspective because it means that those
doctrines can override even explicit congressional directives regarding
which plaintiffs may pursue causes of action seeking to enforce federal
substantive rights.55 One prudential standing doctrine that may be on
the cusp of such constitutional transplantation is the requirement of
"concrete adverseness" between the parties, "which sharpens the
presentation of issues."56 Although a majority of Justices stated as
recently as 2013 that adversity between the litigants was a "prudential
consideration" rather than a "jurisdictional requirement[] of Article
51. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
52. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386 (emphasis added) (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, 459
U.S. at 529, 532-33 (1983)).
53. Id. at 1387.
54. Consider Lexmark itself The Court found that "to come within the zone of interests in a
suit for false advertising under § 1125(a), a plaintiff must allege an injury to a commercial interest
in reputation or sales." Id. at 1390. It then read the proximate cause requirement as permitting
recovery for "economic or reputational injury flowing directly from the deception wrought by the
defendant's advertising" such as injury "that occurs when deception of consumers causes them to
withhold trade from the plaintiff." Id. at 1391. As a functional matter, this seems no different than
saying that the "legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses" a claim based on injuries to
the plaintiffs commercial interest in reputation or sales due to the deception of consumers that
causes consumers to withhold trade from the plaintiff. That framing includes both the zone-of-
interests inquiry and the proximate cause requirement, yet what is "encompass[ed]" in the
"legislatively conferred cause of action" is ostensibly the entirety of the zone-of-interests test. See
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387. Indeed, as discussed supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text, the
Court has sometimes understood a statute's "zone of interests" to be those whose injuries were
"proximately caused" by a statutory violation.
55. E.g., Smith, supra note 4, at 891.
56. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
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III,"@' several Justices have explicitly challenged this view58-most
recently in the Court's 2017 decision in Microsoft Corp. u. Baker.59
Whether Article III imposes an inflexible adversity requirement
is a controversial question. Jim Pfander and Dan Birk, for example,
have made a compelling case that Article III's reference to "cases"
(rather than just "controversies") is best understood to include some
nonadversarial proceedings.0 My focus in this Essay, however, is not to
debate the merits of transplanting the adversity requirement to the
Constitution itself. Rather, it is to examine the particular way that the
three concurring Justices in Microsoft deployed the adversity
requirement.
The plaintiffs in Microsoft had sought certification of a class
action relating to alleged defects in Microsoft's Xbox 360 video game
console.6 1 The district court denied class certification, and the plaintiffs
failed to receive permission to appeal the class-certification ruling
immediately under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f).62 Then,
"[i]nstead of pursuing their individual claims to final judgment on the
merits," the plaintiffs "stipulated to a voluntary dismissal of their
claims with prejudice, but reserved the right to revive their claims
should the Court of Appeals reverse the District Court's certification
denial."63
The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that appellate
courts lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the class-certification
decision in this situation, but it split 5-3 on the rationale.64 In an opinion
written by Justice Ginsburg, the majority ruled on statutory grounds,
57. Id. at 2685-87.
58. See id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J. & Thomas, J.).
59. 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1716-17 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J. & Alito,
J.).
60. See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Adverse Interests and Article III: A Reply, 111
Nw. U. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (2017) ("Article III 'Controversies' have been thought to require a
dispute between adverse parties, but . . . several categories of federal law 'Cases' require no such
dispute."); James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1355 (2015) ("[F]ederal
courts may constitutionally exercise not one but two kinds of judicial power: power to resolve
disputes between adverse parties and power to entertain applications from parties seeking to
assert, register, or claim a legal interest under federal law."). But cf Ann Woolhandler, Adverse
Interests and Article III, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 1025, 1031 (2017) ("This Article takes the position that
Pfander and Birk, while having significantly contributed to scholars' appreciation of the many ex
parte matters handled by the federal courts, have not made the case for reconsidering adversity
requirements for Article III cases.").
61. See Baker v. Microsoft Corp., 797 F.3d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 2015) ("This case involves an
alleged design defect in the Xbox console that gouges game discs.").
62. See Microsoft, 137 S. Ct. at 1706.
63. Id. at 1706-07.
64. Justice Gorsuch-who was not yet on the Court at the time of oral argument-took no
part in the case. Id. at 1706.
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holding that the voluntary dismissal "does not qualify as a 'final
decision' within the compass of [28 U.S.C.] § 1291."63 But a concurring
opinion by Justice Thomas (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito) rejected the majority's statutory argument. The concurring
Justices concluded that there was indeed a "final decision" for purposes
of § 1291, because the district court's order "dismissed all of the
plaintiffs' claims with prejudice and left nothing for the District Court
to do but execute the judgment."33
Instead, the concurring Justices found that "the Court of
Appeals lacked jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution."6 7
They reasoned that Article III's reference to "'Cases' and'Controversies'
... limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to issues presented 'in an
adversary context' in which the parties maintain an 'actual' and
'concrete' interest."6 8 For the concurring Justices, no adversarial case or
controversy existed because "[w]hen the plaintiffs asked the District
Court to dismiss their claims, they consented to the judgment against
them and disavowed any right to relief from Microsoft"; therefore the
parties "were no longer adverse to each other on any claims."9
This understanding of the adversity requirement is difficult to
justify. There is no question that Microsoft and the plaintiffs were
"advers[e]" as to the "issue[]" of whether the district court should have
certified the class action. And it is well established that once a final
decision is reached, § 1291 gives the court of appeals jurisdiction to
review all orders leading to that final decision.70 So if one accepts
Justice Thomas's conclusion that there had indeed been a "final
decision" for purposes of § 1291, there would seem to be no jurisdictional
obstacle to reviewing the pre-dismissal class-certification decision, as to
which the parties were unquestionably adverse.
There may be legitimate questions as to whether a plaintiff who
voluntarily dismisses his or her individual claims ought to be deemed
to have waived or forfeited the right to pursue certain appellate
remedies. That may have been a third basis for refusing to allow the
plaintiffs' appeal in Microsoft, distinct from both the majority's
statutory argument and the concurrence's constitutional argument. But
65. Id. at 1707.
66. Id. at 1716 (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J. & Alito, J.).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1716-17 (alteration in original).
69. Id. at 1717.
70. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 710 (1996) ("The general rule is
that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered, in
which claims of district court error at any stage of the litigation may be ventilated." (emphasis
added) (citation omitted)).
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it is hard to see why Article III compels such an approach to waiver or
forfeiture by treating voluntary dismissal as eliminating adversity
between the parties.
This is precisely the sort of mischief that can arise from
transplanting the adverseness requirement to the Constitution itself.
Consider Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), which explicitly
(a) authorizes a criminal defendant o enter a conditional plea of guilty
that reserves "the right to have an appellate court review an adverse
determination of a specified pretrial motion,"71 and (b) provides that "[a]
defendant who prevails on appeal may then withdraw the plea."72
Justice Thomas's logic in Microsoft suggests that this rule is
unconstitutional. The guilty plea-like a voluntary dismissal-would
seem to extinguish "adversity" and thereby deprive the appellate court
of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
Admittedly, no such rule currently exists for civil cases. One
could imagine, however, either Congress or the federal rulemakers
adopting a similar rule that would allow civil plaintiffs to voluntarily
dismiss or settle claims but retain the right to seek review of specified
pretrial rulings, including class certification. To view adversity as a
constitutional requirement-and to apply that requirement as Justice
Thomas does in Microsoft-would mean that no such rule could pass
constitutional muster.
CONCLUSION
As Fred Smith convincingly shows in Undemocratic Restraint,
the Supreme Court's project of transplanting prudential standing
limitations to statutory or constitutional hosts does little to improve
democratic values. It may, in fact, weaken them. Transplantation has
also failed to bring clarity to numerous unresolved questions regarding
the operation of doctrines such as the zone-of-interests test and the
adversity requirement. Supreme Court decisions issued shortly after
Undemocratic Restraint was published indicate that such questions are
likely to persist.
71. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).
72. Id.
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